1918 Read online

  The AEF in the Aisne–Marne campaign, July–August 1918

  Through most of June and July the Germans struck Allied positions along the Aisne and Marne rivers. Général de Division Foch countered with his own offensive to include 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 26th US divisions. By the end of May Ludendorff’s troops had reached the Marne at Château Thierry and threatened the French capital, less than 50 miles away. In response to the crisis Pershing offered Foch five American divisions. By nightfall of 31 May, the machine-gun battalion of 3rd Division had motored to Château Thierry and was positioned to help the French keep the Germans from crossing the bridge. The remainder of 3rd Division was advancing towards a position to hold the river line. The next day 2nd Division prepared defensive positions north of the Marne and west of Château Thierry along the main highway to Paris.

  For two days German troops hammered the American lines and encountered stiff resistance. Beginning on 6 June, 2nd Division attacked enemy positions against Belleau Wood and the villages of Bouresches and Vaux with the fighting continuing for three weeks. The Americans suffered 9,777 casualties, including more than 1,800 dead. But it was a moral victory for the Marines.

  On 17 July, the Allies launched a counter-offensive to cut the highway leading from Soissons to Château Thierry, the main German supply line in the Marne sector. The troops moved into position on 17 July in the pouring rain, which helped conceal their movements. A short, but intensive artillery preparation took place early on the 18th. Afterwards, Allied infantry moved to the attack from near Soissons in the north to Château Thierry to the south. American infantry was supported by 359 French tanks.

  On 18 July, a Franco-American attack surprised the Germans. To keep the attack secret, there was no preliminary artillery preparation. Infantry jumped off with support of over 550 tanks; on 18 July both American 1st and 2nd divisions made notable progress, advancing over three miles and achieving their objectives by early morning. The next day the corps renewed its attack. The Germans, however, had been heavily reinforced with machine guns and artillery during the night; the French and American infantry found the advance slower and more costly. Fresh from Belleau Wood, 2nd Division was in the thick of the fight and had advanced more than eight miles. During five days at the front 1st Division captured 3,800 prisoners and 70 guns from the seven German divisions. For these gains, the division paid a heavy price, losing 7,000 casualties, including 1,000 killed. With the American 26th Division, I Corps pushed beyond the old Belleau Wood battlegrounds and advanced about ten miles between 18 and 25 July. For the next three weeks, the corps made steady gains against the tenacious German defenders. Advancing with the 42nd Division between 25 July and 3 August and then the 4th Division between 3 August and 12 August, the American corps crossed the Ourcq and then the Vesle, a distance of almost 15 miles.

  At the end of the first week of August, the Aisne–Marne campaign came to a close. The campaign successfully removed the threat against Paris and freed several important railroads for Allied use. From mid-August to mid-September this advance included troops from the American III Corps before they withdrew southwards to join the new American First Army. From 28 August to 1 September, 32nd Division attacked north of Soissons, seizing the key town of Juvigny and making a two-and-a-half-mile penetration of the German lines.15

  American II Corps with the British

  Of the ten divisions that Pershing had loaned Haig in exchange for shipping and training, by August 1918 Pershing had taken back eight of them. The first five divisions (4th, 28th, 35th, 77th and 82nd) left in mid-July for training elsewhere. In fact, Pershing elected to take all ten, but encountered heavy resistance from the BEF commander. Haig did not hold back his bitter resentment over this decision.

  What will History say regarding this action of the Americans leaving the British zone of operations when the decisive battle of the war is at its height, and the decision is still in doubt … I hope events would justify his [Pershing’s] decision to withdraw such a large force of American Divisions (over 150,000 men) from me at the height of battle. For the present, I am convinced that if they had taken a part in this battle, they would, owing to the present tired and demoralized state of the Germans on this front, have enabled the Allies to obtain immediate and decisive results.16

  Foch intervened on Haig’s behalf and negotiated to allow the British to first keep five divisions, but Pershing protested and as a compromise allowed two to remain behind with the BEF; Haig selected the 27th and 30th. The other three (33rd, 78th, and 80th) moved to the east and joined First Army. The frustrated British Army commanders could do little but abide by Pershing’s wishes. At least the British still had two American divisions, and they were good ones. During the final phase of their training, the 27th and 30th entered the line side-by-side in mid-August for their first taste of combat in the Canal and Dickebusch sectors near Ypres.

  They were ordered to assist in the construction of the east and west Poperinghe defensive system, and from 31 August to 4 September the 27th and 30th divisions received their baptism of fire during the Ypres–Lys operation. The inexperienced Americans drove the enemy from Mount Kemmel and the adjacent high ground with the help of the British. Their breakthroughs south of the front prompted German withdrawals in the Kemmel area, thus assuring a successful campaign. Although a minor operation, the Americans gave a good effort and did much to prove to the British they could fight. The 27th Division lost one officer and 72 men killed, while 30th Division suffered two officers and 35 enlisted men killed. On 3 September, II Corps withdrew from the Canal sector and was placed in reserve of British forces for additional training.17

  Hindenburg Line attack

  The confident doughboys, with one operation under their belt, were about to receive a much larger challenge. On 20 September, the 27th and 30th divisions were released from GHQ reserve, where they had been training under the direction of British Third Army, and placed under British Fourth Army to operate with the Australian Corps. Two days later they received orders to move towards the front lines and make preparations for a significant part in the next offensive. Since 8 August 1918 the British Army was in the midst of an offensive to drive the German Army from its positions near the old Somme battlefield, where it had stalled during the Spring Offensive. By mid-September the Germans were forced back to their heavily fortified defensive zone, the Siegfried Position, which the Allies called the Hindenburg Line. The British, with help of the American divisions, were planning to conduct an offensive that would demoralize the enemy and destroy his defences, including wire and dugouts.

  The II Corps’ main objective was to break through the main line in the vicinity of St Quentin, a key line of German resistance, and eliminate the enemy entrenched on the canal and below the tunnel. They would spearhead the British Fourth Army assault on the trenches around the tunnel area with the Australian Corps following. This was a formidable task for any experienced army and the mission, in hindsight, had little chance of succeeding.

  The 27th and 30th entered the front trenches on the night of 25 and 26 September, relieving the 18th and 74th British divisions, and the 1st Australian Division, respectively. The line assigned the doughboys faced the outer defences of the Hindenburg system, to the west of the entrance to the Bellicourt tunnel. The features of this outer line were positions situated on the high ground opposite the Quennemont Farm, Guillemont Farm, and the so-called Knoll. From this outer line the terrain sloped down toward the main defence to the east, rising again at Bony, which was included in the enemy defensive system. For the Americans to achieve their objective on 29 September, they would have to undertake a preliminary operation two days before to occupy the outer defences, including the farms and the Knoll. If successful, this would become the jumping off point for the attacks. That would not be any easy task either. British III Corps also failed to capture this ground after several attempts and now the far less experienced Americans were asked to do the job.

  To prepare for the preliminary o
peration 27th Division entered the front line on the night of 24/25 September, relieving the 18th and 74th British divisions in the Gouy sector. The 30th Division relieved the 1st Australian Division in the Nauroy sector, west of Bellicourt, on the night of 23/24 September. Preceding the attack was an intense artillery bombardment; more than 750,000 shells lobbed at the German defences.18 A unique element to the artillery attack was eight hours of ‘BB’, the British designation for mustard gas. The attack on the St Quentin Canal was the first use of mustard gas by the British during the war even though the Germans had introduced the gas 15 months before. The gas attacks put a number of German artillery batteries out of action and caused casualties.19

  The preliminary ground attack in the 27th Division sector started with the 106th Infantry Regiment advancing towards the objective at 0530hrs on 27 September. They were successful until driven back by machine-gun fire. All three battalions of the regiment were in the line, each supported by four tanks. Elements of the regiment penetrated the German outpost system, but were too weak to cover a front 4,000 yards wide. Support came from the 105th Infantry Regiment, but was of little use. The enemy filtered through the many ravines and communication trenches into dugouts that obviously were unaffected by the artillery.

  The following day a conference at 54th Brigade headquarters, with representatives of the 27th Division and Australian Corps in attendance, discussed the failure of the 106th to capture Quennemont Farm, Guillemont Farm, and the Knoll. This was complicated by the fact that American troops, including wounded, still occupied portions of the trenches around the farms and the Knoll.20 A proposal was to adjust the artillery fire to a line farther in the rear so those troops might advance under its protection.

  After consulting the artillery commander, the conference participants learned that due to lack of time it would be impractical to change the barrage table and bring the barrage back. Fourth Army commander General Sir Henry Rawlinson and General Sir John Monash, commander of the Australian Corps, worried over the delicate situation, justifiably. Failure of 27th Division to secure the objective was the result not so much of inexperience, though that certainly was the case, but of a complicated battle plan devised by Monash and approved by Rawlinson. One writer correctly asserts, ‘This proposal was not Monash at his best. He was expecting a longer advance from the Americans than he had ever demanded of his Australians.’21

  On the 30th Division front, the doughboys were having more success. They launched the advance at 2130hrs on 26 September with the 118th Infantry establishing a line north of La Haute Bruyere.22 With the benefit of trench bombardment, counter-battery fire, and a creeping barrage that cut the wire, they were able to catch the Germans in their dugouts. The Americans formed up to the east of the tunnel, but could not advance due to enfilade fire from the Quennemont Farm on the left. At this point the 5th Australian Division advanced toward the Americans, now in a defensive position. The advance was slowed when the Australians encountered fire from concealed machine-gun posts. Determined, both the Americans and Australians moved forward and captured Nauroy that afternoon.

  The fight continued into the next morning with the 118th Infantry Regiment advancing toward its objective of securing the line of departure for the general attack. Resistance allowed only slight gain. Still, the 30th Division was in a position for the main attack on 29 September.23 Despite the setbacks during the preliminary operation, Rawlinson still held out the hope that the main operation would be a success. In his diary entry of 28 September, he wrote: ‘I feel pretty happy about the prospects as a whole, for, if the Americans are inexperienced, they are keen as mustard and splendid men.’24

  Heavy fog and low visibility greeted the Americans as they launched their Hindenburg Line attack on the morning of 29 September. The 30th Division advance started at 0530hrs under the dreadful conditions of mist and low clouds. Mixed with smoke from the barrages the low visibility hampered their approach. It was a Sunday morning the doughboys would not soon forget, and one an Australian brigade commander thought a ‘spectacle well worth watching’.25

  While 30th Division gained most of its objectives, on its left 27th Division had a much more difficult time. The New Yorkers started their attack nearly an hour earlier, at 0450hrs, with infantry advancing towards the jump-off point that they had failed to reach during the preliminary attack. Reports received at division headquarters indicated the 107th Infantry and 108th ‘going well’. At 0810hrs the 108th was reported to have crossed the Hindenburg Line and was on the way to the tunnel. But an hour later the situation had changed. Regimental messages indicated the 3rd Battalion had suffered heavy casualties from machine-gun fire at Guillemont Farm. By 1005hrs reports received from the 107th Infantry related casualties were heavy and one battalion was falling back. Reports from the 3rd Australian Division confirmed that many ‘Americans were leaderless near Guillemont trench and Willow trench’.26

  Despite such strong opposition, portions of the 108th Infantry Regiment crossed the main Hindenburg Line south of Bony at 0800hrs: a remarkable achievement against enormous odds. The regiment could not go beyond the line, but was able to hold until joined by the 3rd Australian Division. Together, they captured Quennemont Farm. There they came upon pockets of German troops, who appeared from underground passages of the tunnel behind the Americans. Casualties filled the battlefield. ‘They’d just became figures going down’, remembered one New Yorker, ‘like pins in a bowling alley’.27 Because of the fog and poor visibility the 27th had overrun their position and failed to clear the way for the Australians.28 The Diggers secured most of the line in the 30th Division sector, but could not reach the German main line in the 27th Division zone.

  On the extreme left the 105th Infantry Regiment, according to the plan, was supposed to march across the tunnel and turn to the north along the east bank of the canal and seize Le Catelet and Gouy. There the 3rd Australian Division would leapfrog them. They were following behind the 107th, but when that regiment failed to advance because of the fire at the Knoll, the 105th had to take up a defensive position. The 53rd American Brigade commander ordered it to hold against counter-attacks. In liaison with the 18th British Division, they captured the Knoll and Macquincourt Trench. The 105th regimental commander, Colonel James M. Andrews, blamed failure to proceed beyond the Knoll on ‘the smoke barrage laid down by the Allied Artillery that proved very confusing to our troops; the direction of the march was hard to maintain and due to some as yet unexplained phenomena, our compasses were so unstable as to be practically useless’.29 What Andrews fails to mention is that not all of the company commanders had a compass, a failure on his part to ensure that such valuable instruments were in ready supply.

  During the evening of 29 September mixed troops of the 27th Division and the Australian Corps occupied trench lines in the vicinity of the Knoll, Guillemont Farm, and Quennemont Farm. During this fighting the 107th Infantry lost more than half its men, 377 killed and 658 wounded: the heaviest losses suffered by an American regiment during the war.30

  By late afternoon the confidence Rawlinson had exhibited the day before the attack now turned to frustration. After reading field messages reporting fierce opposition encountered by the Americans, he reluctantly concluded they were in trouble. One of Rawlinson’s diary entries records: ‘the Americans appear to be in a state of hopeless confusion and will not I fear be able to function as a Corps so I am contemplating replacing them … I fear their casualties have been heavy but it is their own fault.’31 To compensate for what he arrogantly concluded was American failure to mop up, he changed the plan and now ordered capture of the town of Bony and the northern end of the tunnel.

  Such criticism of the American battle performance was exaggerated. In reality, the Americans had fought quite well against solid German positions in one of the most heavily defended sections of the Hindenburg Line. While it is true that the doughboys were inexperienced, especially in the case of line officers who had not yet seen combat, the main problem they en
countered was the failure of the BEF preliminary artillery attack to soften the German defences. Simply put, 27th and 30th divisions went up against a superior foe and, despite the chaotic moments in the attack, they still reached most of their objectives. On 30 September, they were relieved and sent to a rear area for rest.

  From 2 to 19 October 1918, the 27th and 30th divisions made their final contribution of the war. After a brief rest, following the St Quentin Canal–Hindenburg Line operation, 27th and 30th divisions were back into line. The 30th took part in the 8 October Cambrai operation with the British Third and Fourth armies; a combined effort that forced two German armies to retreat to the Selle River. During the battle of the Selle, the 27th and 30th divisions assisted the Fourth Army in driving six divisions from their defensive position. Since September 27th the doughboys had fought almost continuously, suffering high casualties without replacements. Rawlinson finally relieved the divisions on 12 October 1918, and moved them to a rear area for a well-deserved rest. The Armistice was signed before the divisions would participate again.

  By the end of what became known as the Somme Operation, the American divisions suffered more than 3,400 killed and over 13,000 wounded and missing. The 27th served 57 days on the front line and 30th Division 69 days. Both figures include both front-line training and battle.32

  Pershing’s independent American Army

  By August 1918, Pershing had over a million troops in France. He could now set his sights – and American First Army – on an operation against the St Mihiel salient, a triangle formed between two rivers, the Meuse on the west and the Moselle to the east. Before emptying into the Rhine River, the Moselle flows through France, Luxembourg, and finally Germany. The salient overlooked the Woëvre Plain, a low marshland of ponds and streams surrounded by woods of varying size. The salient’s three anchor cities were Verdun to the north, St Mihiel in the south, and Pont-à-Mousson 25 miles to the east.