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  Then, on 30 August Pershing’s plan to attack the salient was about to be de-railed by Maréchal Foch when the two generals sat down for a meeting. Foch told Pershing, that recently, Allied victories in other fronts had made significant gains, and he now believed the Germans were on the verge of collapsing. Because of these battlefield developments, the Commander-in-Chief informed Pershing that he either had to reduce the scope of the St Mihiel attack or abandon it altogether. Furthermore, Foch declared that a better course of action would be a combined Allied offensive with the British converging on the German lines from north to south, and the French and Americans attacking from the west. An operation against the St Mihiel salient was still feasible, Foch assured Pershing, but only a limited attack on the southern face. It would then have to be followed up with a separate attack against German defences in the Meuse–Argonne, which Foch believed had more strategic importance than St Mihiel. Pershing disagreed vehemently and the meeting was adjourned. The following day Pershing sent Foch a written response, telling him that by no means would he allow the American army to be broken up, and would sacrifice the St Mihiel operation if necessary. If that were the case, he would comply with Foch and attack only in the Meuse–Argonne – but as a whole American army and nothing less.

  On 2 September, Pershing and Pétain met with Foch at Bombon and presented their case. Foch was in a better mood and more reasonable – and for that matter, so was Pershing, perhaps because Pétain was there as a mediator. Foch agreed that the American First Army could execute a restricted attack on the St Mihiel salient, but they were not to push forward to Metz; they must stop after the salient had been reduced and prepare for a larger operation west of the Meuse. Foch insisted that the St Mihiel attack take place no later than 15 September, and the Meuse–Argonne operation would launch by 25 September.

  Pershing had now committed his inexperienced army to undertake two large operations over the course of two weeks.

  St Mihiel

  On 12 September 1918, General John J. Pershing and his newly formed American First Army attacked the St Mihiel salient, a bulge in the Allied lines created by German forces in the autumn of 1914. Sixteen miles deep and 25 miles wide, the salient stretched between Verdun and Nancy and prevented rail transport between Paris and the Eastern Front.

  At the St Mihiel operation First Army utilized 500,000 doughboys, 110,000 French Colonial troops, 1,500 planes, and 3,000 guns. Opposing them were 230,000 Germans who, unbeknownst to Pershing, were preparing to withdraw from the sector and were caught off guard when the attack was launched early on 12 September. The battle was essentially over on the first day, but lasted until 16 September, as First Army mopped up German resistance throughout the salient. It was an impressive showing for the Americans in their baptism of fire, inflicting about 2,000 German casualties (killed and wounded), and capturing more than 1,500 prisoners, 443 artillery pieces, and 752 Maxims and other machine guns. Two hundred square miles of formerly occupied territory went back to the French, including the Paris and Nancy rail lines. American losses were high compared to the German ones; around 7,000 killed and wounded.

  Immediately after St Mihiel, attention shifted south to the Meuse–Argonne. The attack was set for 26 September and planning for the operation was placed in the hands of Colonel George C. Marshall. Between the American and French armies, the Argonne Forest ran northward for about six miles. The plan was not to make a direct frontal assault upon this forest but to force the enemy out of his defences by the threat of surrounding it. Pershing’s ultimate objective in the battle was the city of Sedan, which the Germans had taken early in the war and turned into a vital railway hub to supply their troops. General Max von Gallwitz’s army held the front with five understrength divisions.

  If First Army could drive the enemy from Sedan and cut their rail line, German armies would be trapped between the Americans on the Meuse–Argonne front, French forces converging through the Aisne River valley on the left flank of the doughboys, and the British striking north-west in the Somme sector. Pershing would open the attack by advancing through the Aire River valley with the Argonne Forest on the left and the east bank of the Meuse on the right. To meet the objective, 225,000 doughboys in three corps made up of three divisions each would attack on a front 25 miles wide. Sedan was about 40 miles from where First Army would jump off, and along the way Pershing’s soldiers had to traverse the six-mile-deep Argonne Forest and its assortment of jutting rocks, steep cliffs, and slippery ravines. If First Army’s doughboys made it beyond these obstructions, the fortified barriers of the Hindenburg Line awaited them.

  Pershing and his operations staff visualized the battle in two segments. During the initial attack, First Army would pierce the three German positions, advance another ten miles, then clear the Argonne and link up with the French Fourth Army on the left. The next attack would press forward ten more miles to outflank the enemy defences along the Aisne River, which would place the Americans in striking distance of Sedan and Mézières on the Meuse. Smaller attacks would clear the enemy from the heights facing the east bank of the Meuse.

  Before the battle commenced Marshall first had to move 500,000 troops, 2,000 guns, and 900,000 tons of ammunition and supplies 50 miles into position for the attack on 26 September, but that could not be done until the 200,000 French soldiers left the area where the Americans were to jump off. All travel had to be made under cover of night, while aeroplanes, under command of Brigadier General William Billy Mitchell, moved either early in the morning or just at dusk to camouflage themselves. In the daytime, nothing was to be seen. By the evening of 25 September 1918, First Army with nine attacking divisions placed in three corps were ready to jump off early the next morning.

  Following a three-hour artillery barrage the infantry jumped off at 0530hrs on 26 September. Results for the first day were mixed. Meanwhile 35th Division, including artillery officer Captain Harry S. Truman, took Vauquois Hill early in the day, which had seen fierce fighting between the Germans and the French in the previous years of the war. Then the 35th Division had trouble breaking out of the woods near Cheppy until they were rescued by tank units, including one led by Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton who was badly wounded in the fight and knocked out of action for the remainder of the war. The 28th and 77th divisions made great strides crossing the Aire, but Montfaucon was Pershing’s main objective that day and 79th Division was tasked with the tremendous responsibility of taking the heavily fortified high ground. By nightfall the division reached the outskirts of this landmark and, despite Pershing’s instance that the 79th keep fighting, they ran out of steam. The attack resumed the next morning and Montfaucon was firmly in American hands by the afternoon of the 27th.

  General Max von Gallwitz’s army with five understrength divisions held the ground opposite First Army. Gallwitz was completely caught off guard by the American attack, and although he quickly bolstered the lines by calling up the 51st and 76th Reserve divisions and the 52nd Infantry Division, this was a temporary fix. Gallwitz feared that Pershing’s attack toward the Argonne might have been a diversion to mask a more concentrated thrust in the direction of the Woëvre or Metz. Not until later in the day would he have a good sense of the American First Army’s battle plan after Fifth German Army intelligence interrogated several French and American POWs. Just two days into battle the First Army struggled to advance while American casualties mounted and only got worse as German resistance stiffened after Gallwitz had brought up reserves. Compounding the accurate enemy fire power were clogged roads, poor weather, and the next wave of the influenza pandemic. Pershing saw no other choice but to stop the attack and regroup for a few days. On 4 October he sent the 29th and 33rd divisions to capture the Meuse Heights, but they struggled to drive the German machine gunners from the high ground and it remained in enemy hands for another week.

  In the Argonne the 77th Division was also slowed by German defences that were hard to penetrate in the deep woods. Then a composite battalion fr
om the 307th and 308th Infantry regiments got cut off and were trapped in the forest for five days. The tactical actions in the context of this episode are worth mentioning, not because they changed the course of history, but because they shaped the US memory of World War I to a disproportionate degree compared to their military importance. The composite battalion mentioned above became known as the ‘Lost Battalion’, a 550-man force of US soldiers. It was trapped by the Germans in the Argonne Forest on 2 October after having been separated from the main contingent of the 77th Division. The unit was neither lost nor a battalion, but consisted of six companies of the 308th Infantry Regiment, and a contingent of men from the 307th Infantry. Led by 308th Battalion commander Major Charles Whittlesey, for five days the so-called Lost Battalion remained in the ‘Pocket’, a hill between the Charleveaux Brook and an old Roman road.

  During its ordeal Whittlesey’s men ran out of supplies, ammunition, and food while continuously subjected to German machine-gun and trench mortar fire that inflicted heavy casualties. Friendly artillery from 77th Division guns created added misery and, with communications cut off between the Lost Battalion and headquarters, Whittlesey had to rely on homing pigeons to deliver messages to the rear. On 7 October, the Lost Battalion was rescued after runners broke through the German lines and directed advancing 77th Division troops to the Pocket. Out of the 550 Lost Battalion troops who entered the Argonne, only 194 were rescued unharmed, while the rest were either killed or wounded.

  While on an operation to rescue the Lost Battalion, corporal, later sergeant, Alvin York became the Hero of the Argonne.33 On 8 October 1918, his unit, Company G the 328th Infantry, attached to the 82nd Division, entered the Chatel-Chéhéry sector in Argonne Forest. They were part of an operation to relieve enemy fire pouring down on the Lost Battalion. Corporal York and 16 other doughboys attacked German machine guns protecting a railroad line. After the Americans captured a large group of German soldiers, the Germans counter-attacked, and nine of the US soldiers became casualties. York took charge of the remaining doughboys, and with his skills as a marksman, single-handedly took a machine-gun nest and captured 132 German prisoners. For his heroism on 8 October York would receive more than 50 decorations, including the French Croix de Guerre and the Medal of Honor.

  To the west of First Army the French Fourth Army was also struggling and the depleted force asked Pershing for reinforcements. He sent the 2nd and 36th divisions to help out and they fought with distinction at the Blanc Mont Ridge in the Champagne.

  During the middle of October Pershing sent the 37th and 91st divisions to reinforce a French army division between the Lys and Scheldt rivers in Flanders. The next day both divisions attacked in the direction of the Scheldt between Waregem and Kruishoutem and received heavy fire from Germans troops protected by hedges and abandoned farms. Both divisions would remain under French command until the end of the war.

  But as the battle in the Meuse–Argonne dragged on Pershing was heavily criticized by the other Allied commanders that First Army was in shambles and he was unfit to be its commander. In Washington the President, Secretary of War, and Chief of Staff stood by Pershing, but he also came to the realization that leading both an expeditionary force and a field army was more than one man could handle, especially since some of his division commanders needed more managing than he had thought. This was a steep learning curve for Pershing and his doughboys, and their success depended on having more independence for the corps and division commanders to make decisions on the ground; a fact already recognized by the Allied forces after more than three years of costly fighting.

  Both the British and French high commands offered advice to the Americans from lessons they had learned after the bloody attacks at Ypres, Verdun, the Somme, and most recently the Chemin des Dames. Allied training publications and enemy intelligence reports were shared with the AEF on a regular basis, but there is little reason to suggest that American officers glanced at this ready information, much less digested what British and French officers had to say. Instead, Pershing’s generals were encouraged to take their own initiative, and if they were not up for the task, then they were sacked and replaced. Called by one historian ‘The AEF Way of War’, division commanders ‘adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought’ in the Meuse–Argonne. Attack plans became more comprehensive, ‘employing flexible infantry formations and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives’.34

  A turning point for the AEF came on 12 October when Pershing reorganized First Army. He stepped aside as its commander and put Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett from I Corps in his place and also formed a Second Army with III Corps’ Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard at the helm. Pershing retained command of the entire AEF, but was now essentially an army group commander on a par with other Allied leaders.

  Liggett formally took charge of First Army on 16 October, but much to his dismay Pershing remained close by and interfered frequently with tactical and personnel decisions. Liggett inherited a fighting force that showed great promise, but the men had been in line for extended periods and were exhausted and prone to straggling when they lost contact with their units. Once he felt First Army was back in order he launched another offensive directed right at the Kriemhilde Position. He sent the 42nd Division against the Côte De Châtillon and the 32nd struck the Côte Dame Marie. Both obstacles were heavily protected with machine-gun nests and wire. But positions were pierced by the doughboys, although not until after days of severe fighting and counter-attacks. This key position was now held by First Army, but it took three weeks at the cost of around 100,000 casualties.

  On 1 November, a two-hour artillery barrage preceded what became the third and final phase of Meuse–Argonne. The 2nd and 89th divisions crossed the Meuse against heavy German machine-gun fire. Liggett devised the operational plan into three stages: first, the attack on 1 November, then a pursuit as the Germans fell back, and last, the crossing of the Meuse. Liggett designed a frontal attack, straight at the German lines, just like the opening offensive on 26 September. The only difference was that First Army had come of age, and as Liggett pointed out, they were secure in their knowledge that the Germans were on their last legs. One last thrust would take care of the battle and the war. Everything was coming together.

  During the final stages of the battle an embarrassing episode occurred between two First Army divisions when they both descended upon the city of Sedan. Pershing wanted the Americans to capture Sedan and hand it over to the French as a goodwill gesture, since France had lost the city during the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Instead of an organized military operation, the pursuit to Sedan turned into a debacle. On 6 November, V Corps commander Charles P. Summerall decided that 1st Division, which was on the far left flank, would capture the city. This meant the 1st would have to cross the front and rear of two other divisions, the 42nd and 77th. Summerall wanted this accomplished at night and, along the way, the 1st Division became tangled up with other divisions. One group of soldiers thought another was the enemy and opened fire. Communications and traffic broke down. Sedan was not taken until a week later.

  On 8 November, on behalf of the Allied commanders, Maréchal Foch and a British naval representative met with a German delegation to discuss a ceasefire. The Germans did not agree to Foch’s armistice terms, which were in line with what Pershing wanted. Foch demanded that they surrender their weapons and war equipment, and evacuate their forces back to Germany, among other conditions. The Germans refused to give Foch an immediate answer, and in return he refused to grant a provisional armistice. They had three days, until 11 November, to consider Foch’s terms. Until then the Allies would remain on the offensive. Along the Meuse, from the region of Sedan to Stenay, German machine gunners, clinging to the hills overlooking the river, fought as if they had never heard of peace talks, and prevented the Americans from crossing. At 0830hrs on the morning of 11 November, American commanders received orders to cease advancing 90 minutes later, as an armistice ha
d been set for that exact moment.

  The Meuse-Argonne offensive, 1918

  Despite so many fits and starts, the Meuse–Argonne was an impressive effort by mostly untested American divisions, ultimately involving 1.2 million American and French troops who used 2,417 guns that fired off about 4,214,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. Brigadier General Billy Mitchell’s 840 planes had managed to drop 100 tons of explosives on enemy lines. Yet the battle was fought mostly by soldiers who jumped off from trenches and exposed ground in the face of blistering machine-gun and artillery fire. First Army divisions, inexperienced as they were, penetrated over 34 miles and captured 16,059 German prisoners of war, 468 pieces of enemy artillery, and about 3,000 guns and mortars of all types. During the course of 47 days, 150 French villages and towns, many of them in ruins, were liberated by Pershing’s doughboys at a cost of 120,000 Americans killed and wounded.

  From the opening salvos in the early morning of 26 September until the clock struck at 1100hrs on 11 November, Pershing’s warriors fought tenaciously and bravely, although at times recklessly, and they made an outstanding contribution to the Allies’ victory on the field of battle.

  American troops on the Italian front

  In July 1918, Allied leaders received an urgent plea by the Italian government for troops to bolster its depleted forces. On behalf of the AEF, General Pershing contributed by sending the 332nd Infantry Regiment from the 83rd Division to the Italian front along with medical and supply units, For several weeks the regiment trained in mountain warfare in the vicinity of Lake Garda. Then in early October 1918, the 332nd moved to Treviso for placement as a reserve under command of the Italian 31st Division and prepared for the Italian Vittorio Veneto offensive. On 29 October, the 332nd entered combat in pursuit of the Austrians across the Taliamento River. On 3 November, the Americans attacked an Austrian rear-guard battalion protecting the river crossings. The following day the regiment’s 2nd Battalion crossed the river on a narrow footbridge and skirmished with the Austrians. The Austrian position was taken and the battalion pushed forward along the Treviso–Udine railroad, eliminating several machine-gun nests and capturing a three-inch gun. At the town of Codroipo the Americans seized a large cache of enemy ammunition and supplies. At 1500hrs on 4 November, an armistice with Austria went into effect, and the war was over for the 332nd Infantry.