1918 Read online

  In the final analysis, Pétain’s utterances at various meetings were pessimistic, and he informed Clemenceau that the Germans would beat the British and then the French in turn. Such discussions focused the French Premier’s mind. Whatever Foch’s failings, he was charming, energetic, organized and focused on winning the war. At the Doullens Conference on 26 March, Foch was tasked with coordinating the Allied armies, forming a central reserve and developing plans to plug the growing gap between the French Army and the British Fifth Army. Clemenceau and Lord Milner, the British War Secretary, signed an agreement charging Foch with ‘coordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western Front’. His powers were extended to that of Supreme Allied Commander at a conference at Beauvais on 3 April and he was later granted the title of ‘generalissimo’. In May, Foch was granted authority over the Italian Front. To outward appearances, the Allied forces now had unity of command for the first time in the war, but the cooperation required to make this system work was slow in coming.8

  The command relationship between Foch, Haig and General Pershing will be discussed in due course, but it is worth pointing out that within the French command system there was a frequent lack of cooperation. Pétain was not averse to placing his own interpretation on some of Foch’s later instructions, and on occasion he ignored them completely. The same can be said for more subordinate generals, such as Général de Divisions Marie-Eugène Debeney and Émile Fayolle. In reality, Foch was administrating a system of ‘mission command’; he could issue general directions and identify objectives, but local commanders formulated the operational plans based on their own local assets. While there was much room for disagreement, the character of the French command was totally changed compared to that of 1914. The majority of poor commanders had, by this time, been removed. Those who remained were largely highly professional and fully immersed in the brutal realities of early 20th-century warfare. To take one example, Général de Division Charles Mangin had displayed a ruthless efficiency throughout the war but had fallen from grace following the failure of the Nivelle Offensive in 1917. By 1918 he had returned to favour and his Tenth Army would play a crucial role at the Second Battle of the Marne in July and August. Professional, highly organized and totally dispassionate, Mangin was perhaps typical of the generals of 1918. He had no illusions about the glory of war and knew that victory would only come following a hard and bloody slog. He later summed up the reality of modern warfare with ‘whatever you do, you lose a lot of men’.9

  Excellent staff work would also be a feature of 1918, and in this both Foch and Pétain were aided by very capable chiefs of staff. Foch was ably seconded by Général de Division Maxime Weygand, a brilliant organizer who also possessed an uncanny ability to anticipate his chief’s intentions. This pairing would form a highly competent team for the remainder of the war and Foch’s headquarters at Beauvais became a model of efficiency. Equally important within Foch’s headquarter system was his artillery chief, Général de Division Pierre Henri Desticker, who anticipated artillery requirements at army group level. In his turn, Pétain was aided by a succession of chiefs of operations, Général de Divisions Maurice de Barescut, Julien Dufieux, and Duval, all of whom were highly capable, as was his artillery expert, Général de Division Edmond Buat. By 1918, there had been significant improvements in French Army staff work in general. Improved communications allowed for forces to operate more effectively and good use was made of air force couriers to convey orders more quickly.10 The French intelligence system was also now highly efficient. All of these systems would be greatly challenged by the German operations in 1918.11

  Strategy and doctrine

  The pressing question for senior French commanders was just how to utilize the remaining French forces in the field. As the Germans and Russians progressed with their armistice arrangements in December 1917, it became increasingly obvious that considerable German forces would soon be free to act on the Western Front. In an operational sense, how should the French respond to an attack on the Western Front or an offensive through Switzerland?

  What was certain was that something was about to happen. French intelligence was tracking the build-up of German divisions through radio intercepts and the interrogation of prisoners and deserters. The numbers were extremely concerning. In December 1917 they identified 151 German divisions on the Western Front. By February this had risen to 171, and in mid-March they had positively identified 188, with a possibility of further divisions incoming.12

  A series of War Committee meetings were held in early December 1917 and, perhaps predictably, Pétain advocated a ‘tactic of waiting’.13 This would allow the French and their British allies to develop their defensive systems while awaiting the arrival of the Americans in numbers. Pétain also recognized the need to build up reserves in men and materiel and sought greater levels of cooperation with Haig and the BEF. In terms of defensive doctrine, Pétain was essentially proposing the adoption of German defence-in-depth methods. This was a system that the French had acquired bitter experience of in 1917. On the ground, he advocated multiple lines of defence, and also felt that the front line should be lightly held in order to avoid casualties in preliminary German bombardments. A crucial sticking point for Pétain’s fellow generals, and also politicians, was his willingness to yield territory and withdraw in order to absorb an offensive and draw the enemy onto French reserves.

  Foch, on the other hand, advocated offensive action and the two senior commanders clashed at a series of meetings of the Supreme War Council in the early months of 1918. Foch felt that the Germans might launch another attritional battle similar to Verdun, and in such an event, the Allied needed to be in the position to launch a counter-offensive to draw German forces away. There was some strategic logic in this and Foch cited the role the Somme offensive had played in reducing German pressure at Verdun. However, the language that Foch used to communicate this principle was alarmingly reminiscent of 1914 as he urged French commanders to ‘seize every opportunity to impose their will on the adversary by resuming as soon as possible the offensive – the only means of obtaining victory’.14 Foch communicated these concepts in a series of memoranda, and Pétain’s marginal comments in his surviving copies are reflective of the vastly different mindsets of the two senior generals. Beside Foch’s comments regarding the need for ‘counter-offensives for disengagement’, Pétain had grimly commented ‘With what?’.

  Both Foch and Pétain tried to enlist the support of Clemenceau and Lloyd George and also their British military counterparts, especially Field Marshal Haig. Foch would gradually qualify his remarks and emphasize that he was suggesting counter-offensive rather than offensive action. However, by February the possibility of the Allies mounting a major offensive had receded, and this was expressed in ‘Collective Note No.12’, which envisaged a defensive posture in the West with offensive action occurring against the Turks on the Egypt–Palestine front. There was also increased discussion about returning British and French troops from Italy, but Foch’s proposals to form a central reserve would eventually come to nought. This was covered by ‘Collective Note No.14’, and on 6 February, Foch requested that Haig release nine to ten divisions and Pétain 13 to 14, while a further seven would be returned from Italy. Both Haig and Pétain simply refused to comply, citing their need to retain control over their own reserves for immediate use. The extension of the BEF’s responsibility for a further 54 kilometres of front also took considerable negotiation.15

  The incorporation of American troops into the Allied order of battle also resulted in considerable debate. General Pershing obviously wanted to field American troops as a coherent and single formation. He has been much criticized for this, but, in his defence, the performance of British and French generals up to this point in the war would not have been an encouragement for him to place his troops under their command. But the American troops needed to be equipped and trained. Having initially resisted the amalgamation idea, Pershing agreed to release American regi
ments to serve for a month with French divisions in order to gain the necessary combat experience. Some African-American regiments were released to French command on an indefinite basis. Discussion continued as to the best method of incorporating this new manpower throughout January and February, with Pétain pushing for more integration with French forces, while Pershing saw this as for training purposes only. While Pétain felt that this insistence for an autonomous American force would mean that they would not be ready until 1919, the German Spring Offensive accelerated American deployment, and the US Army played a crucial role throughout 1918. The American forces needed to be supplied with heavy equipment, and this was provided by the French, who contributed aircraft, tanks, artillery and machine guns.

  So, despite the appearance of a move towards unity of command, the respective commanders had significantly difficult views on how to respond to the expected German offensive, and various issues occupied their time in early 1918. Considering this level of debate, how did they communicate intent and doctrine to the troops on the ground? Foch essentially communicated to his subordinate commanders through memoranda, and these addressed broad strategic principles. Pétain and his fellow army commanders issued general orders and communiques, and while these often were general tactical statements and were aimed at encouraging the troops, they also contain specific tactical directions. For instance, Pétain discussed the use of tanks and infantry tactics in his communications in the run up to, and during, the Spring Offensive. In doctrinal terms, all branches of the service had developed their methods considerably, and these were communicated to the troops in a series of pamphlets and manuals, which appeared in increasing frequency during 1918. There was also much more emphasis on realistic training and rehearsal, and by 1918 there had been a total shift in the methods of all branches. In terms of artillery, the French had shown increasing proficiency in artillery fires and were more effective at coordinating suppressive barrages, creeping barrages and counter-battery fire. From 1917, there had also been an increased use of machine guns in the suppressive fire mode. For the infantry, there had been a total shift in tactical emphasis. In 1914, the main tactical unit was the battalion, due to the attacking ethos of the army. By 1918, the main tactical unit was the half-platoon: two sections of infantrymen armed with light machine guns and grenades and trained to use the ground to cover their advance. Although most of the cavalry had been dismounted to serve in the infantry role, some were retrained and served in armoured car units.

  Perhaps the big question that remained regarding the effectiveness of the French Army concerned morale. The senior commanders were well aware that the army had been badly shaken in 1917, and postal censors were alert for signs of discontent. Trench newspapers also gave a good indication of the sentiment of the troops and were monitored by regimental officers and the GQC. The cumulative effect of years of war was found to be taking its toll, yet surprisingly morale was considered to be good on the eve of the Spring Offensive and remained high during its initial phases. French soldiers were extremely sensitive to issues on the home front and expressed anger at the treatment of industrial strikers, especially women workers. There was also contempt for politicians and industrialists who were seen as prolonging the war. The familiar criticism of British soldiers and generals was also expressed and the poor performance of the BEF in the early phase of the offensive was frequently mentioned by disgruntled French soldiers. Despite the huge efforts of the BEF in 1917 and the resultant casualties, many French soldiers seemed to think that the British were not doing their share of the fighting. Soldiers’ letters and newspapers also noted the special transport arrangements made for the American troops; the US troops were provided with lorries while the French soldiers slogged along the road on foot. This was a subject of much discontent. Yet such feelings did not result in a major breakdown once the Spring Offensive started. Although there were some serious lapses in discipline and morale and some units did break and flee under the German onslaught, in general, the average poilu seems to have decided to persevere and to fight it through to the end.16

  Weapons: artillery and tanks

  The potential war plans for 1918 would be carried out by a vastly changed French army. Following the French collapse in 1917, Pétain had instigated a range of weapon production programmes while also expanding existing ones. The primary focus was on artillery, and by 1918 the artillery arm had been expanded to a huge degree. During the course of the war, there had been a shift in emphasis from light field artillery to guns in the medium and heavy range. The classic French 75mm field gun had been shown to have limited utility in trench warfare due to its flat trajectory and the small size of its shell. The army of 1914 had around 300 guns in total. In 1918 alone, over 5,700 guns were added to the artillery strength. These included 720 155mm field guns, 1,980 155mm howitzers, 144 120mm guns, and 576 105mm guns. There had been a total shift in artillery doctrine due to the growing realisation that heavier guns with a greater ability to provide indirect fire and creeping barrages were what was required. There was also an increase in the numbers of mortars with more tubes in the 45mm, 60mm, and 150mm ranges. The smaller calibre mortars (45mm and 60mm) could be operated by infantry teams, and alongside an increase in the numbers of the portable 37mm cannon, the introduction of these weapons increased the firepower within infantry formations to a significant degree.17

  The venerable 75mm still played a role, however, and at the beginning of the year there remained around 140 batteries of these field guns. Some modified guns had a range of 11 kilometres, and in the opening phases of the Spring Offensive they proved particularly effective against attacking formations. Alongside this overall upgrade of the artillery potential of the army, further efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of the artillery. During the course of 1918, increasingly sophisticated artillery methods were introduced, and a range of creeping barrages, flash barrages, counter-battery fires, interdiction, and suppressive barrages were organized to facilitate operations. This necessitated a significant increase in time devoted to training and rehearsal and there was an increase in the number of courses run at the various artillery schools.

  Communications and coordination had always proved problematic, but by 1918 over 350,000 field telephones and 30,000 wireless sets had been introduced. These enlarged the communications nexus across the Western Front and greatly facilitated the implementation of complex artillery plans and cooperation between the branches in general. Staff work had also become more effective, and each formation had a dedicated staff to coordinate the efforts of its associated artillery. There was an increased emphasis placed on aerial reconnaissance and cooperation. There was also a significant refocusing on the use of France’s dwindling manpower. In 1914, the French Army had been predominantly an infantry army, with artillery strength standing at around 420,000. This represented around 20 per cent of the army. By 1918, the artillery branch stood at over one million troops, representing almost 40 per cent of the entire French Army.

  The French tank force was also a major focus in campaign plans for 1918. The French tank programme had its origins in 1915 and was initially driven by one visionary, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Estienne. In late 1915 permission was granted to begin tank development, but for a series of reasons, this had resulted in two actual tank programmes. One programme produced the Schneider, a six-man tank armed with a shortened 75mm gun. The initial procurement programme of January 1916 ordered 400 of these machines, but numerous setbacks delayed production and the first units were not equipped with these tanks until late 1916. The second French tank programme produced the St Chamond, and design and production problems also delayed the delivery of this model in large numbers until late 1916. Ultimately, both programmes were competing for production capacity, and this delayed the introduction of these ‘chars d’assaut’.18 Both suffered from being underpowered and had poor armour protection; the Schneider in particular had to undergo a process of armour modification. In terms of armament there were further problem
s due to the limited traverse of the main weapon. Also, due to their short track length, both tanks had a limited trench crossing capability, and it became practice to send combat engineers to accompany these tanks on operations in order to fill in trenches and create routes for them to cross. Classed as Artillerie spéciale, they were organized in ‘groups’ of 16 tanks. Their technical difficulties led to considering concerns regarding their deployment, as they had limited use as a breakthrough weapon. Their success in 1917 was very limited and usually accompanied by high casualties. Yet both the Schneider and the St Chamond continued in service in 1918 and needed to be factored into future plans.

  The significant shift in French tank plans came with the development and production of the Renault FT-17 tank. The FT-17 was a lighter, two-man design with greater cross-country capabilities and, significantly, a turret capable of rotating through 360 degrees. By 1918, orders for the FT-17 were increasingly removing the Schneider and the St Chamond tanks from the production processes, and by that summer there were over 500 in service. By the end of the war, there would be around 3,000. Armed with either a 37mm cannon or an 8mm Hotchkiss machine gun, the FT-17s served well as mobile gun platforms and could suppress enemy machine guns and also clear routes through barbed wire. Estienne envisaged ‘bee swarm’ tactics, while Pétain advocated using Schneiders and St Chamonds to clear routes through the wire, leaving the FT-17s to suppress the enemy and exploit. By 1918, eight tank regiments had been formed, each with a group of Schneiders or St Chamonds and three battalions of FT-17s. Apart from their offensive potential, all of the tanks could play a significant role in defence and in several cases played a key part in shutting down German attacks during the Spring Offensive. However, the formations of large tanks were still dogged with high casualty rates in operations during the summer of 1918.19