1918 Read online

  As the French Army moved further towards developing a system of what we would refer to today as ‘combined arms warfare’, increasing emphasis was placed on airpower. The Aéronautique Militaire (the French air service) had expanded to a considerable degree during 1917, and in 1918 further numbers of more modern aircraft came into service. There were increasing numbers of the SPAD XIII, operating in the fighter role. Highly regarded by French pilots for its speed (over 130mph) and durability, by the end of the war over 8,5000 had been constructed. While they were also supplied in quantity to the US and Italian air forces, the majority of these went to the 74 French fighter squadrons. The two-seater Breguet XIV also played a significant role in air operations during 1918. Produced in large numbers it was the first aircraft to use a predominantly metal construction, which gave it considerable durability in combat. The Breguet would equip 71 squadrons by war’s end. Officially classed as a bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, further versions were developed for long-range photo reconnaissance, as floatplanes, air ambulances and also as single-seat bombers. In addition, French pilots realized that the Breguet’s construction, performance and armament allowed it to be used more aggressively in air fighting and ground attack. The Aéronautique Militaire also retained some aircraft that were classed as ‘obsolescent’, such as the outdated Voisin and Cauldron bombers. These could still be used in night bombing operations due to the comparative lack of fighter opposition.

  All of these aircraft would play a key role in stopping the Spring Offensive and would facilitate offensive operations later in 1918 flying in the fighter, reconnaissance, bomber, and ground-attack roles. The latter function would be key in assisting French Army operations, and squadrons equipped with SPADs, Breguet, Samsons and other aircraft would be called in to serve in this role. This function brought with it an increased emphasis on ground-to-air signalling, and various visual signalling methods were used to focus aircraft on ground targets. Unlike the Germans, who had developed specific aircraft for ground attack, such as the Halberstadt CL.II and the Junkers J 1, the French did not introduce aircraft designed specifically for this role but preferred to task existing fighter and bomber squadrons with ground-attack operations. In some cases, aircraft were modified with armour protection, but this practice was not widespread.

  By the autumn of 1918, the French air commander, Colonel Charles Duval, had essentially reorganized the force into an independent air force under centralized command. The service had a division and brigade format, which included 66 fighter squadrons and 19 day bomber squadrons. However, some squadrons remained under local command.

  Despite having been challenged operationally and in morale terms during 1917, the French Army of 1918 had undergone a considerable transformation. While numbers of every type of equipment had increased and France’s war industry got into full swing, there was an emphasis on new weapon designs in terms of artillery, tanks, and aircraft that reflected the changing nature of the battlefield. These new weapons and the associated doctrine would be tested in the early months of 1918 before the final offensive operations could begin.

  Defensive operations

  While French intelligence had noted the arrival of German divisions from the Eastern Front throughout the early months of 1918, German operational security ensured that the location of the planned attack remained a mystery. Haig focused on the Albert–Arras area, while French commanders concentrated on the Champagne front, in the area around Reims. Neither army, therefore, had its troops in the right location when the Spring Offensive began.

  The opening blows of Operation Michael on 21 March fell mainly on the British Fifth Army and the right flank of Third Army. It would prove to be a disastrous day for the BEF, with over 50,000 killed, wounded, missing, and POW. Under this formidable German onslaught, the British troops began to yield ground and an alarming gap developed between Fifth and Third Armies. In this worsening situation, Pétain was faced with urgent requests for reinforcement, while also monitoring German activity in the Champagne area. Haig later criticized Pétain for the slowness with which he released reserves, but it can be shown that once he realized the attack represented the main German effort, French reserve divisions were sent to plug the gap. By 23 March, Pétain had ordered 12 divisions to move to the assistance of the BEF, and these were supplemented by a further 13 by 26 March. Pétain had, therefore, already begun sending reserve divisions before Haig had sent his original requests for help.20 There is no doubt, however, that Pétain tried to control these formations tightly, as he feared a BEF collapse and retreat towards Dieppe, which would have to be covered by French forces. While Pétain had resisted Foch’s plan for a central reserve, he had accumulated an impressive reserve contingent for his own purposes. This included five corps (39 infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions), 35 regiments of heavy artillery, and ten regiments of 75mm cannon. These were spread between the French Northern and Eastern Army Groups, while two infantry divisions were sent to bolster the Belgian Army. In pure artillery numbers, Pétain had access to over 6,500 light cannon and over 5,800 heavy and 417 long-range pieces. He had furthermore accumulated a large supply of reserve ammunition, including large supplies of gas shells. The artillery would play a key role in shutting down the German attacks, with 75mm guns engaging German forces over open sights, which had not been seen since 1914.21 In the course of these actions, the 75mm guns alone would fire over four million shells.

  Despite these accumulations of troops and equipment, the end of March 1918 developed into a desperate fight. For the French, it initially fell mainly to regiments from Third Army to respond to Operation Michael and the immediate crisis. In this situation, French commanders were aware of the desperate shortage of cavalry; the majority of French cavalry had been dismounted by this stage the war, while many of the remaining horsed units were countering strikes across France. Infantry units were fed rapidly into the line, many arriving without artillery or reserve ammunition, in a desperate attempt to stop the German advance. Casualties were high, and the force of the blow that had fallen on the BEF became immediately apparent to the French troops:

  By the 24 March the Germans had crossed the Somme, and the following day both Bapaume and Noyon fell before the French could stop the German advance. In a 24-hour period, the Germans launched 15 further attacks on Général de Division Fayolle’s Reserve Army Group, consisting of First, Third, and Sixth Armies. Pétain’s instructions were not to become separated from the BEF, but while Pétain was assisting the British and the Belgians, he was also aware that the operational situation could develop and threaten Paris. His immediate priority became shielding Paris and stopping the Germans from pushing through Noyon and Montdidier. On 24 March, he and Haig had discussed the possibility of the two Allied armies losing contact, and it seemed that the situation would develop into two battles – the BEF fighting to control the Channel ports, while the French defended Paris.

  It was against the backdrop of this worsening tactical situation that Foch was appointed as Allied Coordinator (26 March) and then Allied Supreme Commander (3 April). He immediately ordered ‘Lose not another metre of ground’.22 However, the atmosphere in Paris was less than confident and was not helped by the fact that the capital was now coming under shellfire from the ‘Paris Gun’. This impressive ‘supergun’ began firing on Paris on 21 March, its shells travelling 130 kilometres and entering the stratosphere before falling on the city. By the time that Allied advances stopped its activity in August, the Paris Gun had fired between 320 and 360 shells (exact figures remain uncertain) and had killed 250 people. The worst single episode came on 29 March when a shell hit a packed Paris church during a Good Friday service, killing 91 people. This shelling, combined with Gotha bomber raids and news of the German advance, caused public panic and an exodus from the city, the likes of which had not been seen since 1914.23

  After further withdrawals from the Somme and the loss of Montdidier by the French, Operation Michael began to run out of steam in early April.
Troop exhaustion and supply difficulties had slowed down the German advance. These difficulties were compounded by Allied counter-attacks, including a major operation by Général de Division Denis Auguste Duchêne’s Sixth Army. Having failed to reinforce his advantage over the BEF, Ludendorff called off the offensive on 5 April. The potential of French air power in ground operations also was fully realized. Capitaine René Fonck, the leading French air ace, later wrote of a major operation on 26 March designed to interdict German units on the ground:

  I don’t know who came up with this brilliant idea or how the High Command was persuaded to accept, but from the most distant points of the front, one squadron after another rushed to the danger zone. The roar of aircraft engines was louder than had ever been heard before. We flew so low that we were almost on the tips of their bayonets and our machine-guns rattled at point-blank range on the dense mass of troops below. The bombers were more heavily laden [and] dropped their missiles on the columns and convoys of marching troops. Our attack spooked the horses; they threw their harness into the ditches, creating [a scene] of unutterable confusion.24

  As German pressure eased, Foch and his staff began planning for a counter-offensive on 9 April. On the same day Ludendorff launched Operation Georgette with 36 divisions of General Ferdinand von Quast’s Sixth and General Friedrick Sixt von Arnim’s Fourth Armies. This hammer blow fell on the BEF (First Army and associated Portuguese divisions) and was aimed at attacking the approaches to the Channel ports. Forces crumbled under the weight of the German attack, prompting Haig’s ‘backs to the wall’ communiqué of 11 April. Yet after initial successes and pushing well into Allied lines, this offensive too began to stall by 18 April. Counter-attacks by the British Second Army and a five-division detachment of the French Armée du Nord began to stop the German advance. However, the loss of the strategically important Mount Kemmel by French troops on 25–26 April came as a serious blow. In this sector, three French divisions had moved into line on 18 April, with the 28th Division holding Kemmel itself. There were indications of a potential German attack, and the French were aware that the elite Bavarian Alpine Corps had moved into the line opposite, but the 28th Division had previously suffered serious casualties and could not withstand the attack. Following an intense German barrage that included large quantities of gas shells and an aerial bombardment by over 90 aircraft, the French lost the hill during the morning of 26 April. The loss of this important observation point with seriously criticized by British commanders and troops and tainted the relationship between Britain and France for some time.25

  Bolstered by a further eight infantry divisions and two cavalry corps from Fayolle’s reserve army group, the French line was stabilized by the time Ludendorff shut down Operation Georgette on 29 April. By this time the Germans had suffered over 340,000 casualties – many of these were from assault units, and were irreplaceable. Despite this, Ludendorff launched another operation, Blücher-Yorck, in the hope of drawing troops out of Flanders to allow him to restart Operation Michael. While Foch was expecting a further attack north of the Somme, Ludendorff turned his attention to the Champagne area, in particular the Chemin des Dames, and on 27 May opened an attack on a 45-kilometre front between Reims and Soissons using Kronprinz Rupprecht’s Army Group (General Max von Boehn’s Seventh Army and General Oskar von Hutier’s Eighth Army). In total this force deployed 43 divisions, 4,000 guns, and a number of tanks. Facing them was Duchêne’s Sixth Army and three British divisions that had been moved from Flanders and Picardy as they were deemed to be in an exhausted state. Following an intense artillery barrage, which again used large amounts of chemical shells, the Germans made good progress, threatening Reims and crossing the Marne. Duchêne has since been criticized for packing his troops into the front lines, leaving them susceptible to attack and also denying himself reserves. In his defence, he knew that his troops would not favour withdrawing from territory so hard-won in the spring offensive of 1917.

  German barrages resulted in high casualties, and in the panic to withdraw, the French failed to destroy vital bridges over the Aisne. Stiff resistance before Reims and the transfer of troops from Picardy slowed the German advance as Pétain scrambled to re-deploy divisions to meet this new threat. BEF divisions were not available due to an expected attack in Flanders but two American divisions put in a spirited attack at Château-Thierry.26 On 3 June, Ludendorff shut down Seventh Army’s attack in the face of mounting casualties. On the French side, Général de Division Mangin became the unlikely hero of the hour. Having been returned to command by the Clemenceau government, Mangin put in a successful counter-attack on 12 June along the River Matz with six French divisions and also American troops. By 14 June, Blucher-York had also been halted.

  Concurrently with Blucher-York, Ludendorff had launched Operation Gneisenau on 9 June in an effort to exploit tactical success at that time. French intelligence had warned of this attack, and the opening bombardment was less effective.27 Nevertheless, the Germans made an impressive gain across a 37-kilometre to a depth of 14 kilometres. A surprise French counter-attack started by Mangin at Compiègne without preliminary bombardment stopped the advance, and the operation was called off on 12 June.28

  The final offensive, Operation Marneschutz-Reims, followed a now familiar pattern. Launched by First, Seventh, and Ninth Armies on 16 July, this was effectively Germany’s ‘last throw of the dice’. Interestingly, this operation was also referred to as the Friedensturm or ‘peace offensive’. Again, this was aimed at drawing reserves from Flanders, but German forces were now much-depleted due to casualties and the first outbreaks of Spanish flu among the army. The lack of fuel supplies restricted the activities of the German Luftstreitkräfte (the German air service), and French intelligence confirmed that the attack would take place in the Champagne area. In preparation, Général de Division Paul Maistre’s Army Group Centre (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies) was reinforced with further American divisions. Despite these preparations, and due to the deployment of French troops into the front lines, the German attack inflicted casualties and broke through between the French Sixth and Seventh Armies. French divisions and some Italian divisions fell back before a series of defensive actions at Nanteuil-Pourcy and east of Reims stopped the German advance.29

  These mid-July defensive actions and counter-attacks formed the preliminary stages of the Second Battle of the Marne. The next phase of operations would see the initiative pass to the Allies and began a phase of offensives that would continue to the Armistice in November. By the end of the Spring Offensive, the Germans had suffered over 680,000 casualties killed, wounded, missing and POW. They had made significant territorial gains but had not achieved decision. Furthermore, the German Army was now exhausted and exposed in some dangerous salients. Allied losses had not been insubstantial. The total figure numbered over 430,000 French and 418,000 British troops. Yet, despite being so hard-pressed, their transport systems had managed to move troops, under pressure, to meet attacks as they emerged. Regarding materiel, it was apparent that the Allied now had the advantage in terms of numbers and quality, and operational methods, communications and intelligence and were producing success. The growing American force was increasing in proficiency. These factors would prove decisive in the coming months. While France would play a lesser role in terms of manpower as the war neared its end, its industry would prove essential for equipping the US Army.

  The Second Battle of the Marne, July – August 1918

  Offensive operations

  While the last of the German offensives was still in the process of being shut down, the French began a series of counter-attacks. Foch had long awaited the chance to respond to a German attack with a major operation. By the end of Operation Marneschutz-Reims, the Germans had established a bridgehead over the Marne some 12 kilometres in length and 7 kilometres deep. Foch determined to destroy this bridgehead, and this would feed into a series of counter-attacks that is now referred to as the Second Battle of the Marne. This p
hase marked the beginning of the major French operations that would continue to advance into German-held territory until the end of the war. In the literature of World War I, the battle of Amiens is usually cited as the beginning of the ‘Hundred Days’ phase of operations that ended the war, but this is an Anglo-centric viewpoint. For France, this phase began earlier with the Second Battle of the Marne.30

  Having absorbed and repulsed the final phases of the German attacks, Foch ordered the start of the counter-offensive for 18 July. Due to his recent successes, Mangin was chosen to spearhead the attack with his Tenth Army, which incorporated two American and two BEF divisions. Mangin also had 345 Renault tanks and 500 aircraft at his disposal and the focus of his attack fell between the Aisne and the Ourcg rivers. Général de Division Jean-Marie Degoutte’s Sixth Army would attack between the Ourcq and the Marne with nine divisions, 145 tanks, and 350 aircraft. Artillery provision for both attacks numbered over 3,000 guns, and this combination of focused and highly controlled artillery fires and the use of armour and air support would be the preferred model for the rest of the war. Also, while a creeping barrage was used, there was no preliminary bombardment.